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Buddhism in Current China–India  
Diplomacy
David SCOTT 
Abstract: Buddhism is being emphasised strongly in both Chinese 
and Indian public diplomacy, as they both seek to increase their soft-
power attractiveness. This article finds that while Buddhism has 
served to draw the two countries together in their bilateral relation-
ship, their current invocation of Buddhism as a bridge is in many 
ways an ahistorical reconstruction. The article also finds that Bud-
dhism operates as a tool of diplomacy in a competitive way, as China 
and India both seek influence among Buddhist countries elsewhere in 
Asia and among international Buddhist organisations. Finally, this 
article finds that whereas China’s use of Buddhism is straightforward-
ly tactical and to a degree disingenuous, India is able to incorporate 
genuine spiritual elements into its use of Buddhism, albeit within a 
setting of Hindu reinterpretation of Buddhism. In the future, China 
could shift from a short-term tactical to a long-term normative use of 
Buddhism within international socialisation scenarios. 
 Manuscript received 21 July 2015; accepted 15 March 2016 
Keywords: China, India, Buddhism, foreign policy, soft power, pub-
lic diplomacy  
Dr. David Scott is a scholar whose published works (see <www.d-
scott.com/publications>) cross over from Religious Studies (Bud-
dhist encounters with other religions) to International Relations (for-
eign policy analysis of China and India, including China–India rela-
tions). Having retired from teaching at Brunel University London in 
2015, he remains an active scholar and consultant, continuing to de-
liver presentations on China and India to the NATO Defence Col-
lege in Rome and contributing regularly to the publication China-India 
Brief. A study elsewhere by him on the relative geopolitical and nor-
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Introduction 
This article looks at how China and India have used Buddhism in 
their current diplomacy. By looking at Buddhism in the context of 
current Sino–Indian relations as an example of “faith diplomacy” 
(Seib 2013), this article furthers the wider move in research to “bring 
religion back into the study and praxis of international affairs” (Seiple 
and Hoover 2004: 3; also Fox 2001). In terms of theoretical frame-
work, three related analytical tools that are particularly relevant for 
this article are those of soft power, public diplomacy, and cultural 
diplomacy. The method used in this study is to examine the rhetoric 
of politicians and diplomats from both countries as empirical ex-
amples of soft-power public/cultural diplomacy processes (Hayden 
2011). This rhetoric often includes reconstructed religious histories, 
an appropriation of Buddhism that is essentially politicised and often 
ahistorical, and which is being harnessed in the diplomacy of what are 
two non-Buddhist states. Buddhism has been used for “image man-
agement” not only by China (Ding 2011) but also by India. Such 
politicised and at times ahistorical and propagandist reconstruction of 
Buddhism by states is exactly what critical discourse theory and its 
focus on “hidden agendas” (Rahimi and Riasati 2011: 107) would 
expect. With good reason, Phunchok Stobdan, India’s ambassador to 
Kyrgyzstan from 2010 to 2012, sees Buddhism as a “geopolitical 
tool” (Stobdan 2013) then and now for both China and India. The 
article finds that while Buddhism serves as a generally positive link in 
current China–India bilateral relations, it is also a tool for competi-
tion between them in regional and international settings. 
Ironies from History 
Buddhism was indeed important in both the Indian subcontinent and 
China for approximately one millennium, and there was some interac-
tion as Indian translators went to China and Chinese pilgrims trav-
elled to India (Liu 1988; Bagchi 2011). Given this shared Buddhist 
setting, great stories have been generated by both countries of inti-
mate Sino–Indian relations in the past, which are mooted as an ex-
ample for present and future interstate relations. 
Such a portrayal of Buddhism’s role as a bridge between India 
and China was first generated in the early twentieth century in the 
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“discursive reconstruction of Asia” (Frey and Spakowski 2016: 1) 
found in Pan-Asianism circles (Duara 2001). However, the caution 
expressed by Frey and Spakowski that Pan-Asianism “can not only be 
detected in processes of integration” but “can also relate to moments 
of rivalry, competition, or exclusion within and between political 
entities” (Frey and Spakowski 2016: 2) is applicable not only to the 
pan-Asian movements of the early twentieth century, but also to the 
way that Buddhism has operated in the early twenty-first century as a 
feature of cooperation and competition between China and India in 
Asia.  
Within these pan-Asian circles, a Buddhist-centred history as a 
model for China–India relations in the modern era was exemplified 
by Benoy Kumar Sarkar (1916; also 1922), Liang Chi Chao (Liang 
1924), and Tan Yunshan (Tan 1999; also Tsui 2010), the last having 
founded the Sino–Indian Friendship Society in 1933. Tan Yunshan’s 
teacher, Taixu, led a high-profile Buddhist goodwill mission from 
China to India in 1940 in an attempt to shape further China–India 
civilisational unity, although he was hampered by the “dearth” (Sen 
2016: 311; also Sarkar 1940) of Indian Buddhist monks and monu-
ments in India. 
In the Hindutva groupings of the Mahasabha and the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), Buddhism was seen as a reform wing of 
Hinduism and as a vehicle for wider Indian influence. This “geo-
imaginary of Asia reflected what Vinayak Damodar Savarkar consid-
ered as the unifying identity marker of Asia: the Hindu-Buddhist 
religion” (Stolte 2016: 64). Consequently, “Hindu-Buddhist Asia be-
came an often-heard trope in Mahasabha circles, and one on which 
the organization took action through active networking with Bud-
dhist organizations across Asia” (Stolte 2016: 66; emphasis added). 
The significance of Savarkar is that it was out of the RSS that the 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was later formed, the party currently 
headed by Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, whose government 
is again pursuing Buddhist linkages across Asia. India is able to use 
Buddhism in a more obvious spiritual way, even if it is based on a 
reconstructed religious history, precisely because the BJP has a reli-
gious ideology and the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) does 
not. 
Tansen Sen has been prominent in critiquing such reconstruc-
tions of history in various ways (Sen 2003, 2012a, 2012b; also Kie-
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schnick and Shahar 2013). First, Buddhism came to China in the 
second and third centuries CE primarily through Central Asian net-
works. Second, the tradition that the White Horse Temple in the 
Eastern Han capital of Luoyang was the first Buddhist temple in 
China, established in 68 CE with the arrival of two Indian monks 
Kasyapa Matanga and Dharmaratna, is a fictitious pious invention. 
Third, the level of popular interaction between Chinese and Indian 
Buddhism after the third century was quite limited. Fourth, by the 
fifth century, Chinese Buddhism had developed criticisms and rejec-
tions of Indian Buddhism. Fifth, after the eighth century, Sino–Indian 
relations were related more to trade than to religion. Sixth, there was 
also a divergence in geographic focus after the eighth century: while 
India maintained an intimate relationship with Tibet through Tantric 
Buddhism, Chinese Buddhism had its own sphere of influence in 
East Asia through the distinctive Chinese schools of Chan and Pure 
Land, which spread into Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. Seventh, neither 
India nor China was a modern nation-state during this shared period 
of Buddhist presence, a fact that further qualifies the relevance of this 
Buddhist presence for current “interstate” relations. 
Additionally, neither India nor China is a Buddhist state today. 
Buddhism, though begun in India as an anti-caste, anti-Brahmin, and 
anti-Vedic tradition, declined and virtually vanished from India after 
the thirteenth century, where it had been battered by Islam, and was 
then reabsorbed by a resurgent Hinduism. A two-pronged response 
by Hinduism ultimately defeated Buddhism as an independent rival. 
At the institutional level, Buddhism was rejected in Hinduism as nas-
tika (“heterodox”) and subject to “centuries of anti-Buddhist polem-
ics” (Klostermaier 2010: 375). As to the individual figure of Buddha, 
he was accepted yet subordinated by being considered as but an ava-
tar of Vishnu, and negated by being considered to have been sent to 
preach false doctrines that would mislead the demons. Buddhism 
arrived in China by the third century CE and would come to stand 
alongside Daoism and Confucianism as one of China’s three major 
religious traditions. However, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
proclaimed in 1949, officially remains an avowedly atheistic Marxist–
Leninist state under the ruling CCP, led since 2012 by Xi Jinping. The 
Buddhist Association of China (BAC) was set up in 1953 as a channel 
for state control, but the religion was stigmatised during the 1950s 
and its adherents persecuted during the Cultural Revolution (Welch 
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1972). A gradual recovery, however, has been evident since the 1990s 
(Ji 2004), with the state ready to co-opt Buddhism into its quest for a 
“harmonious society” (઼䉀⽮Պ , hexie shehui) and thereby bolster 
regime survival. Indeed, a final twist in China today is that even as the 
state faces the challenge of absorbing a Buddhist Tibet into an offi-
cially atheist PRC, in wider Han Chinese circles there has been a “re-
turn of interest in Tibetan Buddhism to a level not seen since the 
Republican period” (Tuttle 2007: 223) of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Analysis Framework 
Various related concepts are helpful to understanding the deployment 
of Buddhism by China and India. Such concepts were apparent in a 
speech delivered by India’s foreign secretary, Nirupama Rao. She 
asserted that “the projection of India’s soft power is very much a part 
of the processes of public diplomacy,” that “public diplomacy, we all 
know, is no abstract term – it is a real-world phenomenon, and it 
overlaps with our cultural diplomacy” that aims to “project India [… ,] 
advocating and explaining the Indian ‘brand’ as it were” (Rao 2010b). 
Her comments there with regard to India are equally applicable to 
China. What can be pursued from Rao’s speech are three related 
analytical tools – namely, soft power, public diplomacy, and cultural 
diplomacy. Soft power is the end result, public diplomacy is the gov-
ernment vehicle to achieve such soft power (Nye 2008; Lord 2008a), 
and cultural diplomacy is the aspect of the country often highlighted 
in such public diplomacy. Each of these three analytical tools are now 
looked at in terms of what they mean in general, in terms of how they 
can be discerned in the foreign policy of China and India; and in 
terms of how the Chinese and Indian deployment of Buddhism re-
flects such an analytical framework. 
With regard to soft power, analysis of China–India relations has 
frequently been conducted through a hard-power prism, in which 
military issues have been prominent, such as their unresolved land 
disputes along the Himalayas, which led to war in 1962, and their 
ongoing geopolitical regional rivalry across Asia and the Indian Ocean 
(Garver 2001; Mohan 2012; Smith 2014). This is the domain for IR 
realism theory and the imperatives of interstate competition. In their 
economic relationship, a frequently deployed “Chindia” (Ramesh 
2005) narrative of common complementary economic rise is entwine-
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ed with rising Chinese trade surpluses vis-à-vis India, energy competi-
tion (Zhao 2012), and water security issues (Christopher 2013). 
Alongside such quantifiable hard-power military and economic 
issues is what was pinpointed and popularised by Joseph Nye in 2004 
in his seminal book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. As 
its subtitle suggests, soft power is a matter of foreign policy, of states 
seeking to “incorporate the soft dimensions into their strategies for 
wielding power” (Nye 2004: 1). Its role in foreign policy is important 
precisely because “in behavioural terms, simply put soft power is 
attractive power” (Nye 2004: 6), pursued in order to affect the behav-
iour of other states. Because soft power is all to do with creating 
images for others to perceive, it is indeed a “representational force” 
(Mattern 2005) in international politics, which in the case of China is 
often explicit propaganda (Edney 2012). 
China’s use of soft power is a clear part of its foreign policy 
strategy (Callahan and Barabantseva 2001; Yu 2007; Wuthnow 2008; 
Li 2009; Monroe 2010; Li and Worm 2010). China’s foreign minister, 
Wang Yi, emphasised that “with a view to cultivating and enhancing 
China’s soft power, we will also try to make China’s voice heard” 
(Wang 2013); Xi Jinping addressed the Central Conference on Work 
Relating to Foreign Affairs, saying, “We should increase China’s soft 
power, give a good Chinese narrative” (Xi 2014b); and the Central 
Committee identified improving the country’s soft power as a “key 
concern” (Xinhua 2015b) from 2016 through 2020. China’s sense of 
its own “national cultural soft power” (ഭᇦ᮷ॆ䖟ᇎ࣋, guojia wenhua 
ruan shili) has been manifest in the “faith diplomacy” (Zhang 2013) 
strategy it has applied as it has leveraged Confucius (Paradise 2009; 
Hartig 2012) and Buddhism (Ranade 2011; Angelskar 2013; Dotezac 
2014). The Chinese government can, and does, use the simple fact 
that China has more Buddhists (in actual number) than any other 
country in the world for its particular soft-power diplomacy, even if 
the state ideology is not Buddhist. 
If we turn to India, Shashi Tharoor, diplomat turned govern-
ment minister, has argued that, 
increasingly, countries are judged by the soft-power elements they 
project […] through the export of cultural products, the cultiva-
tion of foreign publics or even international propaganda. (Tharoor 
2009) 
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Not surprisingly, he has been an advocate of India’s own soft-power 
assets (Tharoor 2008). Such a projection is a matter of state policy, 
reflected in Foreign Secretary Rao’s sense that “our ‘soft power’ gives 
us advantages” (Rao 2010a; also Purushothaman 2010; Malone 2011). 
Rao’s talk of soft-power advantages was reiterated at the prime minis-
terial level, through Modi’s use of Buddhism: 
The time has come for us to realize the potential of soft power as 
an important strategy for external affairs and foreign relations 
[…]. Soft power is becoming increasingly critical in world affairs 
[…]. India should leverage its great traditions and culture in forg-
ing ties with countries around the world in a way that is deeper, 
more personal, and therefore, far more powerful […]. Countries 
that have Gautam Buddha […] as part of their own culture have a 
bond with India that transcends diplomatic ties. In the domain of 
soft power India has a lot to offer to the world. (Modi 2015b) 
As the original hearth of Buddhism, India is able to thereby trump 
China’s soft-power card of having the world’s largest Buddhist popu-
lation (Thussu 2013). 
Public diplomacy is highly “strategic” (Lord 2008b), as it is chosen 
and pursued through governmental policies, rhetoric, and actions that 
are all aimed at external public opinion (Melissen 2008; Snow and 
Taylor 2008; L’Etang 2009). It is very much a question of “nation-
branding” (Szondi 2008). This makes public diplomacy essentially an 
image-related mechanism (Gilboa 2001), a “war of ideas” (Reilly 
2008) through image construction. Consequently, public diplomacy is 
a matter of public relations (Signitzer and Coombs 2010), whereby 
international relations between states become international public 
relations crafted by states for an international audience at large and to 
shape a suitable image (Kunczik 1997). Even as academics have de-
bated public diplomacy theory (Gilboa 2008), both India (Hall 2012) 
and China (d’Hooghe 2015) have demonstrated clear public diplo-
macy aspirations, and both have set up mechanisms to deliver public 
diplomacy. 
The Xinhua News Agency, with its online presence Xinhuanet, is the 
official press agency for China. It is a ministry-level institution subor-
dinate to the central government, and it is a vehicle for China’s public 
diplomacy efforts. Its hope that “public diplomacy adds [a] soft touch 
for China” (Xinhua 2013) raises the danger that other countries be-
come a soft touch for China – that is, that they become vulnerable to 
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China’s influence. The declared mission of the China Public Diplo-
macy Association, established in 2012, is to “advance the develop-
ment of China’s public diplomacy, enhance mutual understanding 
and friendship between China and the rest of the world, project to 
the world a positive image of China” and “create an international 
environment conducive to China” (CPDA 2014).  
China’s setting up of the Boao Forum for Asia has become an 
established part of its softer diplomatic face, or Good Neighbour-
hood policy (ⶖ䛫৻ྭ᭯ㆆ, mulin youhao zhengce). This is part of Chi-
na’s ongoing reassurance diplomacy, which uses soft words to create 
a soft image to increase its soft power (Wang 2008; Wang 2010; Scott 
2012). As one Chinese observer delicately put it, public diplomacy is a 
way of “managing national reputations” (Wang 2006), which in Chi-
na’s case reflects a problematic hard-power reputation that Beijing 
hopes can be improved through its soft-power deployment of Bud-
dhism. The Chinese state-controlled media has acknowledged the 
advantages for China in its deployment of Buddhism. Such deploy-
ment can “increase its [China’s] influence in the region” and “project 
a harmonious, accepting image as the country seeks to increase its 
influence with its religious neighbors”; although unsettling under-
tones can be discerned in the claim that “religion is becoming the 
glue that can help bond the region under the Chinese dream” (Chen 
2015). 
In India, a special Public Diplomacy Division was set up within 
the Ministry for External Affairs in 2006. Four years later, the divi-
sion held an international conference in New Delhi, titled “Public 
Diplomacy in the Information Age,” which was addressed by Foreign 
Secretary Rao (2010b). The Ministry of External Affairs also has its 
glossy magazine In Focus, which serves as a further vehicle for India’s 
public-diplomacy message shaping, as exemplified by Chand’s piece 
(2014) on Buddhism’s role in India’s current outreach to Myanmar. 
In a similar vein, India’s then national security advisor Shivshankar 
Menon (2010) acknowledged the effect of public diplomacy in 
smoothing India–China bilateral relations through specific cultural 
links from the past such as Buddhism. 
Cultural diplomacy can indeed be considered as the “the linchpin 
of public diplomacy” (US 2005). This involves culture being used as 
an instrument of diplomacy, as countries highlight or, indeed, con-
struct features of their culture in order to project an international 
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image, gain influence, and shape bilateral relations (Finn 2003; 
Lenczowski 2008; Mark 2009). Culture can be a soft-power lever for 
states to use in their foreign policy. 
With regard to China, during the first decade of the 2000s, “cul-
tural diplomacy” (᮷ॆཆӔ, wenhua weijiaobecame increasingly treat-
ed as a third pillar of China’s diplomacy, alongside traditional political 
and economic levers (Palit 2013). China’s minister of culture, Sun 
Jiazheng, was clear on its diplomatic usefulness. He considered that 
“cultural diplomacy has created a good atmosphere for Chinese over-
all diplomacy” since it “promotes trust” and “alleviates doubts when 
developing relations with neighbouring countries” (Sun 2004). Like 
public diplomacy, China’s cultural diplomacy also focuses on soft-
power goals (Lai 2012). At both the 18th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China, held in November 2012, and the Third 
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of China, held in November 2013, the need to strengthen Chi-
na’s “cultural soft power” (᮷ॆ䖟ᇎ࣋, wenhua ruan shili) was stressed. 
With regard to India, cultural diplomacy has also been pursued 
by India, reflecting Tharoor’s sense of it being “Indian culture that 
gives India its soft power” (2008: 43). A long-running vehicle for this 
pursuit has been the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), 
founded by the government in 1950 and specifically tasked with cul-
tural diplomacy. The ICCA’s president, Lokesh Chandra, has been 
clear enough on “tapping into Buddhism as a key arm of our cultural 
diplomacy” (Kasturi 2015) that operates as an “instrument” (Kumar 
2008) of India’s cultural diplomacy. In part, this aspect of India’s 
cultural diplomacy exists because “New Delhi aims to use Buddhism 
to neutralize any Chinese soft-power advantage” (Pratap 2015: 58). 
In the interplay of theory and practice, Buddhism has already 
been explicitly linked to each of the analytical frameworks in this 
section. The empirical sections that follow similarly reflect the soft-
power public/cultural diplomacy considerations in play for both Chi-
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The General Use of Buddhism within the  
Foreign Policy of China and India 
India and China are in different starting positions regarding how 
easily each can use Buddhism in its public diplomacy. There are two 
historical reasons for this: First, whereas India can claim to be the 
birthplace of Buddhism, it has long ceased to be a Buddhist-dominat-
ed country. The 2011 census recorded 8.4 million Buddhists in India, 
constituting a meagre 0.7 per cent of the population. In contrast, 
China has long had the biggest number of Buddhist adherents, cur-
rently estimated at between 200 and 300 million; even if that number 
has traditionally been blurred by simultaneous adherence to Daoism 
and Confucianism, and even if the People’s Republic of China offi-
cially follows an atheist ideology. Second, Buddhist links between 
China and Southeast and East Asian states had centuries of continuity 
that were strategically used during the twentieth century by the Re-
public of China (ROC) and then the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC). In contrast, Buddhist links between India and Southeast/East 
Asia had been absent for several centuries due to the advance of Is-
lam and resurgence of Hinduism in the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries. 
It is evident that the Chinese leadership is using Buddhism tacti-
cally, as the country has “shown increasing interest in tapping Bud-
dhism as a convenient diplomatic resource” (Zhang 2012: 27). Invok-
ing Buddhism enables China to point to itself as the biggest Buddhist 
country, and thereby gain further soft-power attractiveness among 
smaller Buddhist countries in Southeast Asia (such as Thailand and 
Myanmar) and in South Asia (such as Sri Lanka). The rationale for 
the deployment of Buddhism was outlined in the Chinese state media 
as intending to “project a harmonious, accepting image [and] increase 
its [China’s] influence with its religious neighbours” through Bud-
dhism “becoming the glue that can help bond the region under the 
Chinese dream” (Chen 2015). 
Moreover, promoting China’s version of Buddhism and the 
symbolic authority of government-selected figures – such as Gyain-
cain Norbu, China’s appointed Panchen Lama – helps to counterbal-
ance the influence of the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan cause outside 
China. It was in this vein that the Panchen Lama’s appointment in 
2010 as vice president of the Buddhist Association of China (BAC) 
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came complete with his internal and external pledges that he would 
“uphold the leadership of the Communist Party of China […], safe-
guard national unification, play a role in building a ‘harmonious socie-
ty,’ and expand Buddhist exchanges” (Xinhua 2010). 
The current Chinese leader Xi Jinping has some personal links 
with Buddhism. His father, Xi Zhongxun, for years wore a watch 
presented to him by the Dalai Lama; his mother, Qi Xin, was buried 
with full Tibetan Buddhist rites, and his wife, Peng Liyuan, is a per-
sonal practitioner of Tibetan Buddhism. Xi Jinping made some posi-
tive remarks in 2014 about Buddhism’s contribution to Chinese soci-
ety, although that may have been spurred more by regime survival 
considerations and a need to placate the domestic Buddhist commu-
nity. Xi Jinping has also made deliberate use of Buddhism in delineat-
ing his public vision of China’s place in the modern world. At 
UNESCO headquarters, Xi unfolded the following story: 
Buddhism originated in ancient India. After it was introduced into 
China, the religion went through an extended period of integrated 
development with the indigenous Confucianism and Taoism and 
finally became […] Buddhism with Chinese characteristics […]. 
The Chinese people have enriched Buddhism in the light of Chi-
nese culture and developed some special Buddhist thoughts. 
Moreover, they also helped Buddhism spread from China to Ja-
pan, Korea, Southeast Asia and beyond. (Xi 2014a)  
Xi’s panorama was a Buddhist past embedded in China’s own Sino-
centric, Middle Kingdom world – with India thereby somewhat super-
seded. His qualifying phrase “with Chinese characteristics” (ᴹѝഭ⢩
㢢, you Zhongguo tese) has also been applied by the Chinese government 
to concepts like “democracy” and “international relations” for equally 
political motives. 
Meanwhile, in its public diplomacy, India has the advantage of 
the historical founder Gautama/Shakyamuni. He may have been 
born in Nepal, around Lumbini, but he has been adopted as a “son of 
India” (bharata ka beta). It was in India at Bodh Gaya that he obtained 
enlightenment, thereby gaining the title of the Buddha, the “Enlight-
ened One.” It was in India at Sarnath that the Buddha gave his first 
sermon, it was in India that he continued to teach the Dharma, and it 
was in India that he set up a continuing community: the Sangha. Fi-
nally, it was in India at Kushinagara that he died. These sites have 
been linked together in the “Buddhist Circuit” by the Indian govern-
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ment, organised domestically by the Ministry for Tourism but also 
used externally in Indian diplomacy. Their wider importance has been 
noted by government figures, who have acknowledged that  
it is very useful to have focus on the Buddhist Circuit as well be-
cause that is one of the more important linkages that we have with 
Southeast Asian countries. (Akbaruddin 2014) 
Previous ministers for external affairs, such as Pranab Mukherjee, 
have been ready to claim the Buddha’s mantle for India: 
We can rightfully be proud that India is the janm-bhoomi [“land of 
birth”] and karma-bhoomi [“place of work”] of this great son of 
ours. It is also a matter of pride for all Indians that it is we who 
nurtured and developed the Buddha’s teachings and spiritual tradi-
tions at Nalanda, Vikramsila and other Buddhist centres after his 
parinirvana. (Mukherjee 2008) 
In addition, Mukherjee invoked Buddhist missionaries from India, 
going on to say that “his [the Buddha’s] message of peace and toler-
ance was carried abroad by Indians” (Mukherjee 2008). The geo-
graphic range was broad, including  
Mahinda, the son of Emperor Ashoka, [carrying the message] to 
Sri Lanka, […] Padmasambhava to Tibet, […] Kashyapa Matanga 
and Bodhidharma to China, and […] countless others to the vast 
swathe of our world from Central Asia to the islands of Japan. 
(Mukherjee 2008) 
On the diplomatic benefits of invoking Buddhism, Mukherjee had 
already argued that “the renewed interest in Asia’s Buddhist heritage 
will rekindle ancient links between East and South Asia and will help 
us come closer together” (Mukherjee 2007).  
Narendra Modi has taken a particularly strong lead in invoking 
the Buddha and Buddhism, a lead that represents “an amalgamation 
of cultural and faith-based diplomacy” (Chauhan 2015: 2). Previously, 
as chief minister of Gujarat, Modi took a personal interest in the 
rediscovery of ancient Buddhist sites. He also made a point of visiting 
Buddhist events. At the Buddhist Heritage Seminar organised in Gu-
jarat in January 2010, he celebrated the modern “relevance” of Bud-
dhism and, irritatingly for China, went on to praise the “authority” 
(Modi 2010) of the Dalai Lama. Currently, as prime minister, Modi 
has made highly positive comments about the figure of the Buddha, 
tweeting, “On Buddha Purnima, we bow to the venerable Lord Bud-
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dha, whose teachings have guided the entire humanity for centuries” 
(Modi 2014a). He continued to make a point of attending important 
Buddhist-related events, being chief guest at the International Buddha 
Poornima Diwas celebrations (Vesak) in May 2015, organised by the 
International Buddhist Confederation.  
Modi has publicly embraced the Buddha as a reformer whose 
message has been reabsorbed back into Hinduism. Of course, this 
devalues the independent development of Buddhism as a religious 
tradition, but it enables Modi to use the Buddha to portray Hinduism 
in a better light and to shape a more Indian focus for Buddhism. 
Modi played a particularly prominent role at the Global Hindu-
Buddhist Initiative on Conflict Avoidance and Environment Con-
sciousness held in New Delhi in September 2015. He welcomed the 
delegates with domestic but also external nuances: 
You are visiting a nation that is extremely proud of its Buddhist 
heritage [… which] draw pilgrims from ASEAN nations, as also 
from China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia, and Russia […]. My gov-
ernment is doing everything possible to give an impetus to this 
Buddhist heritage across India, and India is taking the lead in 
boosting the Buddhist heritage across Asia. (Modi 2015e) 
On the third day, Modi joined the delegates for a trip to Bodh Gaya, 
leading a formal meditation session underneath the sacred Bodi tree 
where the Buddha was supposed to have achieved enlightenment. 
Modi cited Vivekananda’s earlier incorporation (Long 2005) of the 
Buddha into Hinduism and went on to assert,  
I would personally call India “Buddhist India” as it has imbibed all 
the values and virtues of the teachings of Buddha by their [i.e. 
Hindu] religious scholars incorporating them in their literature. 
(Modi 2015f) 
In effect, Modi made the Buddha into a national asset by incorporat-
ing his life into a Hindu context: “Buddha is the crown jewel of the 
Indian nation […]. So, Hinduism after the Buddha’s advent became 
Buddhist Hinduism or Hindu Buddhism” (Modi 2015e). Further-
more, the holy sites of the Buddha’s ministry were deployed as an 
international asset: 
I recognise how Buddhists all over the world revere Bodh Gaya as 
a place of pilgrimage. We in India would like to develop Bodh 
Gaya so that it can become the spiritual capital and civilisational 
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bond between India and the Buddhist world. The government of 
India would like to provide all possible support that its Buddhist 
cousin nations need for the satisfaction of their spiritual needs 
from this holiest of holy places for them. (Modi 2015e) 
By contrast, because of the nature of the Chinese political system and 
its underpinning ideology, Xi Jinping is unable to make such overtly 
“spiritual” use of Buddhism towards Chinese “political” ends. 
Alongside this official domestic embrace and further use of 
Buddhism within India, there has been a noticeable external invoca-
tion of the Buddha and of Buddhism within Indian diplomacy under 
Modi (Mohan 2014, 2015). Government officials stated that the Modi 
government was “keen on drawing up a Buddhist connect as part of 
its Look East, Act East policy,” with BJP officials claiming that “Mr. 
Modi is well aware of the connections that Buddhism has in the en-
tire region, and who better to string it together than India, the home 
of the Buddha” (Haidar 2015). 
India’s soft-power bridge of Buddhism was invoked at length 
during Modi’s visits to Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Japan, 
whereas Xi Jinping’s visits to those countries had no similar Buddhist 
invocations. This is not to suggest that Buddhism is the most im-
portant feature in India’s relationship with those countries. Rather, 
the geocultural invocation of Buddhism facilitates the geopolitical 
advantages of drawing Sri Lanka and Myanmar out of China’s orbit 
and strengthening security cooperation with Mongolia, Vietnam and, 
above all, Japan, who have similar concerns about a rising China. 
Soft-power linkages thereby feed into the hard power–balancing be-
haviour that IR realism theory would expect. 
Buddhism as a Tool for Cooperation between 
China and India 
Many a speech by politicians and diplomats from China and India has 
stressed the historical cultural linkages between the two countries, 
through their having been neighbouring Buddhist countries for many 
centuries in the past. Such a view of history was evident when Wang 
Xuefeng, the Chinese consul at Kolkata, suggested to an Indian audi-
ence that  
Buddhist culture has always had very special importance in the 
cultural exchange of the two countries [...]. Historically, Buddhist 
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culture has marked a magnificent chapter in the friendly exchange 
of China and India. (Wang 2014)  
This reconstructed history is used as a model for the current relation-
ship by Chinese officials. In such an irenic vein, the director of the 
State Administration for Religious Affairs (SARA) in 2007, Ye 
Xiaowen, argued that “Buddhism played an important role in the 
process of the communication between the two countries” and that 
“such a role is continuing to function, and will function well in the 
future” (Hindustan Times 2007). India’s previous minister of external 
affairs, Somanahalli Krishna, also stressed this bridge, saying, “Bud-
dhism is a strong cultural bond between us” (Krishna 2012). He felt 
that the criss-cross of travellers and Buddhist pilgrims were “power-
ful symbols of connectivity between our societies [… ,] a powerful 
symbol of our shared history” and an illustration of “the power of 
culture to bring about perceptional changes” (Krishna 2010). 
The most famous of the Chinese pilgrims travelling to India was 
Xuan Zang, who stayed in India for 14 years in approximately the 
630s, and who diplomats such as Le Yucheng consider “a household 
name in China and India” (Le 2014). The Chinese ambassador to 
India, Sun Yuxi, told a hard-nosed audience at the National Defence 
College of India that the “journey of Xuan Zang to India paves the 
way for the communications of soul and exchanges of emotion be-
tween the two great civilizations” (Sun 2006). 
Consequently, in 2005, the Chinese and Indian governments 
pledged to work together on constructing a Xuanzang Memorial Hall 
at Nalanda. Chinese funding for the project was forthcoming. Chi-
nese foreign minister Li Zhaoxing attended the opening of the me-
morial hall in February 2007, as did the Indian minister for tourism, 
Ambika Soni. Li’s audience included Ye Xiaowen and more than 100 
Chinese Buddhist monks vetted by the Chinese government. 
Further use of Xuan Zang as a bridge in China–India diplomacy 
has come with Narendra’s Modi’s advent to power, and his interac-
tion with the Chinese leadership headed by Xi Jinping. This use of 
Xuan Zang was noticeable in Xi’s trip to India in September 2014, 
where he was taken to Modi’s home state of Gujarat. Modi’s stated 
reasons for taking Xi to Gujarat were partly political, partly econom-
ic, but also partly related to Buddhism: 
The monk Xuan Zang, who came to India from China in 600 AD, 
went to Gujarat and stayed in the village where I come from. 
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Through the medium of Buddhism, India and China – especially 
China and Gujarat – have developed very close relations. From 
this perspective also, his coming to Gujarat reminds us of a rela-
tionship that is of special historic and cultural significance. (Modi 
2014b) 
It was no surprise that the subsequent Joint Communiqué (India–
China 2014) included promises that China would help India to pro-
mote its tourism products and the routes related to the travels of 
Xuan Zang to India. Xi reciprocated during Modi’s trip to China in 
May 2015, when he took Modi to the White Goose Temple in Xi’an, 
which commemorates Xuan’s return from India. Xuan Zang went on 
to take charge of the White Horse Temple in Luoyang, where he 
remained until his death, a temple which has been the venue for fur-
ther Buddhist-related cooperation between China and India. 
The White Horse Temple in the Eastern Han capital of Luoyang 
is traditionally, though probably erroneously, held to be the first 
Buddhist temple in China, established in 68 CE with the arrival of 
two Indian monks, Kasyapa Matanga and Dharmaratna. Dhar-
maraksha, the Kushan translator, resided at the White Horse Temple 
from 289 to 290. In the fifth century, Bodhidharma, the famous 
founder of the Ch’an (Zen) school of Buddhism supposedly arrived 
at the temple from India. As noted already, on his return from India 
Xuan Zang remained as abbot at the White Horse Temple until his 
death. 
A bilateral project concerning the White Horse Temple was 
agreed upon at the highest level during Wen Jiabao’s visit to India in 
2005. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) set out that the 
Indian government would assist with the funding in addition to 
providing the architectural design and construction material. In the 
Indian Parliament, government officials explained the project in 
glowing terms, whereby  
it is expected that the Temple, once completed, will become an 
enduring symbol of the centuries-old cultural exchanges between 
India and China, of which Buddhism is an important and integral 
part. (Ahamed 2005)  
Five years later, the edifice was finished, complete with Sanchi Stupa 
and Sarnath Buddha replica statuary provided by India. The Indian 
president, Pratibha Patil, was the official guest of honour at its inau-
guration ceremony. Patil, of course, was diplomatic in the extreme. 
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Her remarks there began with the site’s supposed past “symbolizing 
an intermingling of Indian and Chinese cultures,” in which  
as the resting place of two great cultural ambassadors from India, 
the monk-scholars Kasyapa Matanga and Dharmaratna, it is a re-
minder of how our civilizations enriched each other. (Patil 2010)  
She finished with the present and future, whereby  
in realizing this monument of India–China friendship, I hope that 
this shrine will further enhance people-to-people contact between 
India and China by encouraging greater exchange in the current 
age and in times to come. (Patil 2010) 
Buddhism as a Tool for Competition between 
China and India 
Almost 40 years ago, Krishna Gupta noted that to both India and 
China “the Buddhist connection has become a useful psychological 
device to project their own corresponding images of parity and as-
cendance in history” (Gupta 1979: 39). Their respective competitive 
deployment of Buddhism as a foreign policy device is even more 
evident in 2016. 
Divides over Tibetan Buddhism are particularly deep in the on-
going disputed frontier between China and India. Competition has 
also been noticeable in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar, where both 
China and India have deliberately invoked Buddhism in various ways 
in their foreign policy relations and diplomatic interactions with those 
countries. In addition, further east, India currently invokes Buddhism 
as a cultural-civilisational link in its strategic partnerships with Vi-
etnam, Mongolia, South Korea, and Japan in part to soft balance 
against China. China, by contrast, focuses more on economic entice-
ments with those last four Buddhist countries. Finally, competition 
has also been noticeable between China and India with regard to 
international Buddhist organisations. 
Tibet is an immediate issue where religion and geopolitics divide 
India and China (Norbu 1997). The history of the Tibetan issue is 
complicated. Prior to Chinese military forces bringing Tibet (back?) 
under Chinese sway in 1950, Tibet’s traditional position was as a theo-
cracy, in which the Dalai Lama, as leader of the Gelugpa School, also 
held political power. The second leader in the Gelugpa hierarchy was 
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the Panchen Lama. Other schools had their own leaders – for ex-
ample, the Kagyu School with their Karmapa. Tibet became a highly 
divisive issue for India and China when the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin 
Gyatso, fled in 1959 over the Himalayas into Indian sanctuary. In 
Chinese eyes this was bad enough, but the decision to set up the Cen-
tral Tibetan Administration (CTA) as a government in exile on Indian 
soil at Dharamsala was even more damaging. The Dalai Lama may 
have formally renounced political leadership in 2011, but he remains 
an ongoing symbol for the Tibetan cause, safely ensconced in India. 
Tawang, the leading Tibetan Buddhist centre in Arunachal Pra-
desh, has become a further point of friction between China and In-
dia. The visit by Pranab Mukherjee (the minister for external affairs at 
the time) to Tawang on the occasion of the 8th Buddha Mahotsava 
attested to this Indian co-optation of Tibetan Buddhism. Mukherjee 
told his audience that  
Tawang finds a special place in the spiritual and cultural history of 
Buddhism […]. We are very proud of your efforts to develop the 
state and your patriotic spirit. (Mukherjee 2008)  
He tied together religion and politics by saying that “Buddhism is an 
important and integral part of life and tradition in Arunachal Pra-
desh” and that “the Chinese side is fully aware that Arunachal Pra-
desh is an integral part of India” (Mukherjee 2008). Tawang’s place as 
the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, Tsangyang Gyatso, gives it fur-
ther importance within the world of Tibetan Buddhism. Moreover, 
Indian government permission for the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang in 
2009 contributed to further dissonance between the two countries. 
The Dalai Lama’s visit, with “India’s encouragement” (Sun 2009), 
was denounced in China. Meanwhile, the Indian government called 
the Dalai Lama an “honoured guest” who was free to visit any part of 
India, including Tawang. 
India’s role as a sanctuary for Tibetan Buddhist leaders fleeing 
from Chinese-controlled Tibet was reiterated in 2000, when Ogyen 
Drodul Trinley Dorje, the 17th Karmapa, fled across the Himalayas 
to take sanctuary in Dharamsala alongside the Dalai Lama. The pic-
tures of the two exiled Tibetan leaders meeting on Indian soil in-
creased Chinese suspicions: “China is firmly opposed to any sepa-
ratist activities that might emerge in the wake of the Karmapa Bud-
dha’s leaving Tibet for India” (People’s Daily 2000). China has instead 
unsuccessfully tried to build up the credibility of its own Panchen 
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Lama figure, Gyaincain Norbu Banquin Erdeni, in part by allowing 
his appearance at its approved World Buddhist Forums held in Chi-
na. 
Nepal traditionally has followed a pro-India policy in the Hima-
layas. However, following the collapse of the Hindu monarchy in 
2008, Chinese officials have been ready to play the Buddha card in 
this new post-Hindu setting in Nepal: 
The traditional friendship between us has a long history. Early in 
the Jin and Tang Dynasties, Chinese Master Monks Fa Xian and 
Xuan Zang have made pilgrimages to Lumbini [...]. And nowa-
days, Chinese and Nepalese people are still talking about the white 
pagoda in Miaoying Temple in Beijing which was built by Nepa-
lese architect Aniko as the symbol of the friendship between us. 
(Yang 2012) 
Lumbini has been a focus for Chinese penetration, at the expense of 
India. A Beijing-backed organisation founded and chaired by Xiao 
Wunan, the Asia Pacific Exchange and Cooperation Foundation 
(APECF), signed a framework agreement with the Nepalese govern-
ment for the Lumbini Buddhist Special Cultural Zone in May 2011. 
This APECF initiative included plans to build temples, an airport, a 
highway, hotels, convention centres, and a Buddhist university in 
Lumbini. The APECF’s links with the Chinese government attracted 
comment, the more so given Xiao’s admission that the “APECF is 
part of the grander strategy of increasing China’s soft power” (Sala 
2013). Reservations on the part of the Nepalese government left that 
particular APECF project stillborn within a matter of months. How-
ever, in late 2013 the Buddhist Association of China, whose vice 
president is the Beijing-selected 11th Panchen Lama, announced it 
had plans for the development of Lumbini. The BAC’s presence 
represents more direct involvement by China in matters regarding 
Lumbini. 
Talk of infrastructure links to bring “Buddhist tourism” trails 
from China into Nepal through an extension of the Qinghai–Lhasa 
railway line down to Lumbini has been a source of concern for India. 
A significant counterproposal was made by Narendra Modi in his 
official trip to Nepal in August 2014: “assistance for development of 
Janakpur, Baraha Chhetra, and Lumbini, including linking Lumbini 
with the Buddhist Circuit of India” (India–Nepal 2014). 
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Sri Lanka represents another location of the China–India rivalry. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, India seemed to give its support to the 
minority Tamil Hindu community rather than to the majority Sinha-
lese Buddhist government. By contrast, Chinese military assistance to 
the central government enabled the Sinhalese leadership to crush the 
Tamil Tiger insurgency in 2009. This gravitation of Sri Lanka towards 
China was compounded during the ten-year presidency of Mahinda 
Rajapaksa from 2005 to 2015, during which time Sri Lanka accepted 
Chinese infrastructure projects at Hambantota and Colombo, gave 
firm support to China’s Maritime Silk Road initiative (which India 
had grave reservations about), and granted docking facilities to Chi-
nese submarines at Colombo in 2014.  
Competition was renewed between China and India with the 
surprise victory in the Sri Lankan presidential race of Maithripala 
Sirisena in January 2015. India has invoked Buddhism in order to 
recover diplomatic ground and influence in Sri Lanka. When Sirisena 
visited India in February 2015, Modi stressed old ties in the shape of 
the  
link forged 2,300 years ago, by Prince Mahindra, known as Arahat 
Mahinda in Sri Lanka, and his sister Sanghamitra. They went to Sri 
Lanka as apostles of Buddhism. (Modi 2015a) 
In turn, Modi stressed Buddhist links in his address to the Sri Lankan 
Parliament, promising, “We will bring our shared Buddhist heritage 
closer to you” (Modi 2015d). In a simple but telling gesture, Modi 
offered alms to Buddhist monks at the Mahabodhi Society in Colom-
bo, an overtly religious act that that would be impossible for Xi to do. 
Myanmar is another Theravada Buddhist country in which China 
and India have sought influence. In November 2011 China sent a 
holy Buddhist relic – a supposed tooth of the Buddha – to Myanmar, 
where it was publicly displayed for 48 days. This was the fourth time 
since the 1950s that the tooth had been sent to Myanmar, previous 
deployments being in 1955, 1994, and 1996. Along with the tooth 
came a high-level Chinese government official delegation led by 
SARA director Wang Zuoan and the president of the BAC, Master 
Chuanyin. Top Burmese officials, including the president at the time, 
Thein Sein, awaited the holy relic’s arrival to pay homage to it when it 
arrived in the capital, Naypyidaw. 
Two months after the exhibition of the Buddha’s tooth, China 
and Myanmar signed an MoU on establishing friendly relations be-
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tween Beijing’s Lingguang Temple, where the Buddha’s tooth is kept, 
and the Shwedagon Pagoda of Myanmar. The deputy director of 
SARA at the time, Zhang Lebin, tied the agreement into wider aims 
to “[deepen] Buddhist culture exchange” so that it will “play a greater 
role in enhancing the two countries’ bilateral ties” (Xinhua 2012). It is 
no coincidence that Thein Sein made four trips to the Lingguang 
Temple. His latest trip in 2014 was greeted with comments from his 
Chinese host that “Lingguang Temple and Myanmar have forged a 
profound friendship between the people of the two countries and a 
friendship of believers in Buddhism of the two countries” (Hou 
2014). It is worth noticing that Sein’s visit included a trip organised 
especially for him by his Chinese hosts to the White Horse Temple in 
Luoyang. 
India has also invoked Buddhism in its diplomacy towards Myan-
mar (Chand 2014). The five-day goodwill visit to India by Senior 
General Than Shwe in July 2010 resulted in an MoU on Indian assis-
tance in restoring the Ananda Temple in Bagan, a renowned Buddhist 
shrine in central Myanmar. The 2012 visit to Myanmar by the Indian 
PM at the time, Manmohan Singh, included various Buddhist-related 
matters highlighted in the India–Myanmar Joint Statement. The 
statement outlined that the two countries “welcomed the prepara-
tions that have been made towards organizing the International Con-
ference on Buddhist Heritage in Myanmar,” noted that “the Myan-
mar side thanked India for its decision to gift a 16-foot sandstone 
replica of the Sarnath Buddha later in the year that will be installed in 
the precincts of the Shwedagon Pagoda,” and went on to state that 
Myanmar “conveyed its appreciation to India for the facilities and 
courtesies being extended to Myanmar pilgrims visiting India” (In-
dia–Myanmar 2012). The International Conference on Buddhist Her-
itage in Myanmar was duly opened in December 2012 by India’s min-
ister for external affairs, Salman Khurshid. He remarked on Buddhist 
pilgrimage linkages between the two countries in which “India, as the 
birthplace of Buddhism, has its fair share” (Khurshid 2012). China, of 
course, is at a disadvantage vis-à-vis India, in having secondary rather 
than primary Buddhist sites on its soil. 
Buddhist organisations present a final venue for China–India ri-
valries. China’s vehicle for influence has been the World Buddhist 
Forum (WBF) – which it hosted in 2006, 2009, 2012, and 2015 at 
Hangzhou, Wuxi, Hong Kong, and again Wuxi, respectively – where 
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China can operate as a “patron of global Buddhism” (Pond 2012). 
The theme of the first WBF meeting was “A harmonious world be-
gins in the mind,” while at the second the official theme was “A har-
monious world, a synergy of condition.” Such terminology deliberate-
ly pointed to China’s flagship policies of seeking a “harmonious soci-
ety” (઼䉀⽮Պ, hexie shehui) inside China and a “harmonious world”  
(઼䉀ц⭼, hexie shijie) outside China. Hence, the official linkage that  
China has been striving to build a harmonious society and advo-
cating the construction of a harmonious world. Advocating the 
Buddhist spirit of harmony, peace and benevolence will undoubt-
edly push forward harmony in China and the world. (Xinhua 2006)  
Not surprisingly, the Dalai Lama has not been invited, and instead 
the WBF settings have served as a public platform for Gyaincain 
Norbu, China’s Panchen Lama figure. China is also trying to build up 
the wider profile of Chinese Buddhism through the WBF Forum: 
“China realized that Chinese Buddhism had far less influence than 
Theravada Buddhism and Tibetan Buddhism in the world” (Zhang 
2013: 79). 
Similar nuances were evident when China hosted the 27th Gen-
eral Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists (WFB) in 
2014. Chaunyin, at the time the president of the government-approv-
ed Buddhist Association of China which hosted the event, comment-
ed that “the conference is a milestone for Chinese Buddhism. It will 
allow China to play a greater role in the Buddhist world” (Seneviratne 
2014). China was also able to gain support from other delegates. 
Medagama Dhammananda, a vice president of the WFB, was delight-
ed with the conference and took China’s side against the Dalai Lama, 
who he agreed had contributed to creating a bad image of China in 
the eyes of the world. “We are very happy about China giving leader-
ship to the Buddhist world,” he said (Seneviratne 2014). 
India’s Buddhist vehicle has been the International Buddhist 
Confederation (IBC) based in New Delhi. At its inaugural meeting in 
December 2011, delegates heard statements by Banagala Uptatissa, 
head of the Mahabodhi Society of Sri Lanka, who said, “The whole 
world looks to India because of Buddhism. If someone from India 
takes initiative, India can take leadership of the Buddhist world” 
(Saxena 2011). The IBC’s inaugural meeting, at which there were no 
delegates from China, due to the Dalai Lama’s presence, was a source 
of friction between China and India. The Special Representatives 
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talks on the Sino–Indian boundary dispute slated for the end of No-
vember were called off after the Chinese objected to the Dalai Lama’s 
presence at the IBC, where he gave the valedictory address. The IBC 
meeting of 2013 again showed these competitive undertones between 
China and India. In a further insult to China, the Indian authorities 
denied a visa to Xiao Wunan, the head of the APECF, which had 
been involved in trying to set up the Lumbini Buddhist Special Cul-
tural Zone as a joint China–Nepal activity. 
The IBC went on to organise the International Buddha Poorni-
ma Diwas celebrations in May 2015, with Modi as its chief honoured 
guest. In September 2015 the IBC co-organised a conference called 
the Global Hindu-Buddhist Initiative on Conflict Avoidance and 
Environment Consciousness, which was addressed by both the Indi-
an minister for external affairs, Sushma Swaraj, and Narendra Modi. 
As noted earlier, Modi joined the delegates on their subsequent visit 
to Bodh Gaya. Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar, Thailand, Vi-
etnam, Cambodia, and Japan all sent delegates to the Hindu–Bud-
dhist conference, but China did not. Undertones of Indian–Japanese 
political alignment were manifested in both the attendance of Minoru 
Kiuchi, Japan’s minister for foreign affairs, and the special video mes-
sage sent by Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister. 
Conclusions 
China’s and India’s use of Buddhism evinces some elements of bilat-
eral cooperation but also some greater elements of regional competi-
tion between the two states. Such competitive Buddhist features feed 
into the larger battle across the Indo-Pacific for relative influence 
between China and India. In effect, the historical geocultural setting 
of Chinese-shaped Buddhism versus Indian-shaped Buddhism mir-
rors the current geopolitics of regional competition between these 
adjacent states. As to where the potential for future developments 
may lie, a continued mix of cooperation and (greater) competition 
around Buddhism seems likely, a microcosm of China–India relations 
as a whole. 
This article finds that India, despite its position of disadvantage 
in having a Buddhist community comprising less than 1 per cent of 
its population, has been able to deploy Buddhism with regard to third 
countries more successfully than has China. Part of the reason for 
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this lesser degree of Chinese success in its soft-power use of Bud-
dhism has been China’s hard-power, military-related actions and drive 
to reassert tight political control in Tibet, its increasingly assertive 
actions in the South China Sea, and the general reassertion of CCP 
orthodoxy, first under Hu Jintao and now under Xi Jinping. 
Nevertheless, the article does not argue that Buddhism is the 
main driving force in the China–India relationship. It accepts that 
traditional hard-power territorial and military issues – the stamping 
ground of IR realism imperatives – together with economic issues 
such as trade and energy security are more immediate primary deter-
minant forces in China–India relations. 
The exception to this secondary role played by Buddhism in 
China–India relations is the issue of Tibet. Buddhism affects the 
moral legitimacy and continuing insecurity of China’s political control 
over Tibet. This question of control over Tibet remains a domestic 
and foreign policy issue in which Buddhism spills across the Sino–
Indian border. It was in this vein that Xi Jinping’s meeting with Chi-
na’s Panchen Lama in June 2015 came complete with a heavy official 
line and implicit criticism of the Dalai Lama, in which “President Xi 
expects the Panchen Lama to be a patriot” (Xinhua 2015a) supporting 
integration with the PRC rather than any separatism. The Panchen 
Lama’s support of Chinese policies on Tibet is precisely why he is 
lauded (Xinhua 2016) by the official media. The “securitisation of 
Tibetan Buddhism” (Topgyal 2012) in China involves issues of politi-
cal control over Tibet. China’s attempts to control Tibetan Buddhism 
are also related to Chinese claims to Arunachal Pradesh, particularly 
with reference there to Tawang. Consequently, Tibetan Buddhism 
has become an important political issue not just in domestic Chinese 
affairs, but also in China’s relations with India. China remains hyper-
sensitive over “foreign interference in Tibetan Buddhism affairs” 
(Global Times 2010), which represents an “insecurity dilemma” (Top-
gyal 2011) caused by worries over any weakening of its security grip 
over Tibetan Buddhism. This takes us back to the pragmatic and 
instrumental but ultimately cynical adoption of Buddhism by the 
Chinese state in its foreign policy. As the Global Times bluntly ex-
plained in May 2015, Buddhist figures recognised in China and de-
ployed in their diplomacy must “be willing to pledge their support to 
the leadership of the Communist Party of China” (Huang 2015). A 
radically different projection of the role of Buddhism was apparent in 
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Ambassador Stobdan’s paper Buddhism and Asia’s Connectivity, which 
was presented at the Raisina Dialogue held in March 2016. Stobdan 
concluded his paper by arguing that “India needs to start thinking 
about seeking a greater transformation in China from authoritarian-
ism to embracing the culture of Buddhism” (Stobdan 2016: 79), but 
this cuts across the increasingly authoritarian leadership control being 
exerted in China by Xi Jinping. 
Peter Martin (2014) argues that the tactical rather than normative 
use of Buddhism by China means that Buddhism’s role as a genuine 
bridge between China and India leaves something to be desired. 
However, China’s invocation of Buddhism may indeed be a pragmat-
ic way for an authoritarian, non-Buddhist leadership to shape its im-
age now, but what of the future? Here, the tactical use of Buddhism 
in China’s public diplomacy feeds into a wider, related debate on 
China’s “international socialisation.” State socialisation theory con-
cerns “the process by which states internalize norms originating else-
where in the international system” (Alderson 2001: 147), an argument 
heavily influenced by constructivist arguments from Nicholas Onuf 
and Alexander Wendt. Such a process may beckon for China. Super-
ficial adoption of particular norms by governments for short-term 
tactical reasons, if maintained through a “logic of habit” (Hopf 2010), 
may lead to norms being internalised at a deeper, more genuine level. 
This possibility has already been raised with the Chinese leadership’s 
espousal of Confucian-derived “harmony” tenets, but it can also be 
raised vis-à-vis China’s continuing deployment of Buddhism within 
its public diplomacy. Such a process would improve China–India 
relations. 
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